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Trade and Labor Standards in the European Union: A Gravity 
Model Approach 
 
1. Introduction 
 
An issue that continually attracts a lot of attention during trade negotiations 
between developed and developing countries is the conventional wisdom that 
countries with lower labor standards gain an unfair advantage in the production 
and export of labor-intensive goods because of lower labor costs.  This question, 
however, has not been analyzed (empirically) as much in a North-North 
framework, especially for countries that are part of regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) such as the European Union (EU), and with distinct labor laws and 
practices1.  The issue that arises in the case of RTAs is whether harmonization of 
standards is necessary in order to prevent trade liberalization resulting from 
economic integration from leading to an erosion of working conditions.  Since 
differences in labor standards (and hence labor costs) may increase the threat of 
social dumping, it is important to consider whether trade is indeed affected by 
labor standards in the first place.  This paper, therefore, seeks to contribute 
empirically to a complex and politically sensitive area, where empirical work is 
lacking.  
Indeed, the choice of labor standards across EU-15 countries is likely to be 
different and shaped by domestic interest groups, voters and national governments, 
                                                 
1 A cursory look at data (for example unionization rates, social protection as a percentage of GDP 
hours worked, and number of ILO conventions ratified) for EU-15 countries reveals that there are 
important differences even though these countries have similar political systems (Van Beers 1998).   
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even though these countries have similar political systems2.  In spite of several 
attempts for harmonization of standards over time, EU countries continue to 
maintain distinct labor practices.  For instance, a European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was signed at the 2000 European Council meeting in Nice, 
but these rights are principles rather than binding rights.   
An examination of labor standards among EU countries, and their potential 
impact on trade flows, is thus important.  As the largest trading area in the world, 
the EU is an ideal candidate for such an analysis because of the considerable degree 
of integration within that trading bloc3.  Increased integration in the EU has 
brought member countries into closer and more frequent contact with each other, 
and the recent enlargement of the EU in 2004 (as well as the possibility of future 
enlargement) is likely to continue this trend.  As a result of these changes, one 
could argue that policies in one country are now more likely to have welfare 
redistribution effects and consequences for labor standards in other countries.  On 
a more pragmatic note, the availability of reliable data on labor standards makes 
empirical analysis possible.   
Following the OECD (1996), labor standards are defined as norms, rules 
and working conditions that govern working conditions and industrial relations.  
As such, labor standards in this paper include all the institutional elements of labor 
markets such as unionization rates, the number of hours worked, and rates of 
                                                 
2 See Gitterman (2003) and Dehejia and Samy (2008) for a brief history of labor standards in the 
European Union, 
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occupational injuries among others.  Our definition is therefore different from core 
labor standards, which are represented by eight ILO conventions defining four 
fundamental rights at work.  We use the gravity model of trade augmented with 
labor standards to examine the link between labor standards and trade across 
countries in the European Union as it is a standard (and empirically successful) 
model to examine the determinants of aggregate trade flows between pairs of 
countries 
 The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 reviews existing empirical 
work on trade and labor standards.  Section 3 presents the modelling framework 
that will be used as well as the empirical strategy for a panel data environment.  
Section 4 presents and discusses the main empirical results.  Section 5 concludes.     
 
2. Literature Review 
Since the OECD (1996) report on Trade, Employment and Labor Standards, a 
number of studies have examined the empirical relationship between trade and 
labor standards.  The OECD (1996) itself, by eyeballing scatterplots, found no 
evidence that low-standard countries enjoyed a better export performance than 
high-standard countries.  This was followed by other studies (for example Rodrik 
(1996), Flanagan (2002), Dehejia and Samy (2004, 2009)) based on large sample and 
more rigorous statistical analysis, and a variety of indicators for labor standards, 
which found no (or very weak) evidence that low labor standards have an impact 
                                                                                                                                           
3 According to estimates from UNCTAD, intra-EU trade as a percentage of total exports for EU 
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on trade performance.  These studies consider both developed and developing 
countries and conclude that natural determinants of comparative advantage in the 
form of factor endowments are important factors in explaining trade patterns, as 
opposed to labor standards.   
Flanagan (2002) uses panel data (the others use cross-sectional data) but the 
validity of the results can be questioned once again as only ILO conventions are 
used as proxies for labor standards.  The Rodrik (1996) and Dehejia and Samy 
(2004, 2009) studies, based on cross-sectional data, are more compelling since these 
authors use a variety of better indicators for labor standards, in addition to ILO 
conventions ratified.  A few studies have also analyzed this issue for developed 
countries.  For example, Rodriguez and Samy (2003) use time series data and 
examine the effects of labor standards on US export performance.  They obtain 
very weak evidence that low standards help boost export competitiveness.   
The study that comes closest in terms of empirical framework to the 
current paper is the one by Van Beers (1998), which extends a gravity model with 
bilateral trade flows and examines how the latter are influenced by labor standards 
in OECD countries, using a labor standard indicator (a synthetic index constructed 
by the OECD) based on actual labor regulations for 1992 data.  Van Beers (1998) 
finds that labor standards do not have any significant impact on the exports of 
labor-intensive goods.  However, when a distinction is made in terms of skill-
intensities, both the exports of labor-intensive and capital-intensive commodities, 
                                                                                                                                           
and accession countries was more than 60% in 2004 
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which are produced with relatively high-skilled labor, deteriorate with an increase 
in the strictness of labor standards.  No attempt, however, is made to check the 
robustness of the results for subsequent years, and to use different indicators of 
labor standards for sensitivity analysis.  The fact that only 1992 data is considered 
carries the risk that the results of the analysis could be based on an 
unrepresentative year.   
Dehejia and Samy (2008) in a recent paper have examined the relationship 
between labor standards and trade performance for EU-15 countries based on a 
Heckscher-Ohlin framework and using panel data for the period 1980-2001.  They 
find some evidence for the conventional wisdom when exports of the EU to the 
rest of the world are considered but labor standards exert less of an influence than 
the traditional determinants of comparative advantage.  When intra-EU exports are 
considered, the evidence for the conventional wisdom is rather weak and the 
authors even find evidence going in the other direction, which they explain 
through productivity effects.  Dehejia and Samy (2008) also investigate whether 
there has been a race to the bottom of standards over that time period and again 
their results are not conclusive: some standards have converged while others have 
diverged.   
In assessing existing empirical work on trade and labor standards, Freeman 
(1996) mentions that “Neither the Rodrik nor the OECD (1996) study is definitive.  
The effect of labor standards on comparative advantage and trade is one of 
empirical magnitude, which further research should be able to clarify.  We need 
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studies with alternative measures of standards, models and samples of countries” (p. 
103).  Since Freeman’s comments, a number of studies have appeared (as seen 
above) but very few have examined the issue within the context of RTAs such as 
the EU, where despite sharing relatively similar political systems, member 
countries retain their policy autonomy in the choice of labor standards.   
In the next section, we examine the modelling framework and empirical 
strategy that we will use in the current paper to analyze the issue of trade and labor 
standards for the EU. 
 
3. Modelling Framework 
Both Brown et al. (1996) and Dehejia and Samy (2004) have shown that a labor 
standard is an additional cost (since it uses some capital and some labor) and may 
change a country’s comparative advantage, depending on the factor intensity of the 
standard and the country’s endowments of factors4.  This will, as a result, 
determine whether the country exports or imports the good affected by the 
standard.  Because standards are costly, may improve productivity, and enter the 
worker’s utility function in their models, it is important to empirically examine 
their overall effects on export performance, which are not clear a priori.  In other 
words, it is not necessarily the case that low labor standards will have a positive 
influence on export performance, as is often argued. 
                                                 
4 Kanbur and Chau (2002) have in fact confirmed empirically that ratification of ILO Conventions is 
indeed costly. 
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 In a gravity context, the labor standard can be interpreted as being 
equivalent to an indirect trade cost, as for example, a government policy that 
imposes safety standards on certain firms.  Suppose the world is made of N 
countries and a continuum of differentiated goods.  In this world, countries 
specialize in a range of goods.  Let the factory gate price of goods from country i to 
j be equal to pi.  The effect of a labor standard imposed on the production of a 
good, such as safety at the workplace, going from country i to j is to increase the 
price to pizij where zij is a markup factor, so that the buying price with the standard 
is pizij > pi since zij >1.  Note, however, in the same spirit as Dehejia and Samy 
(2004) that the standard may also improve productivity so that in effect it reduces 
the value of zij.  In fact, the productivity effect may be so high that pizij < pi if zij < 
1.  The sign of zij is an empirical question that we will examine in the next section.  
For the time being, leaving productivity effects aside, and as in Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003), if consumers have CES preferences and with a common elasticity 
of substitution among all goods, the gravity equation can be written as    
σ−
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ji
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X   (1) 
where Xij refers to exports from country i to country j; Yi, Yj and Yw refer to the 
gross domestic products of country i, country j, and the world respectively; σ > 1 
is the elasticity of substitution; zij is the cost due to the labor standard5; Πi and Pj are 
                                                 
5 More generally, we can think of the cost due to the labor standard as part of the total trade costs 
(direct and indirect). 
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outward and inward multilateral resistance variables for countries i and j 
respectively, that is, average trade barriers. 
Equation (1) means that we can extend the gravity equation with variables 
for labor standards to consider the influence of the latter on bilateral trade flows.  
This approach is beneficial for two reasons.  First, compared to a Heckscher-Ohlin 
model, which relies on multilateral trade flows, the gravity model considers 
bilateral trade flows; differences in labor standards across countries may lead to 
opposite effects on trade flows, which can cancel out in a multilateral framework 
but not in a bilateral one.  Second, as mentioned before, the gravity model is 
consistent with the factor proportions model, models of trade based on increasing 
returns and product differentiation, and new trade theories (see Bergstrand (1989), 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Deardorff (1998).  For example, the new trade 
theories, which make allowance for increasing returns to scale, imperfect 
competition, and geography and trade can be easily estimated in a gravity 
framework by controlling for market size, population size, GDP and distance.       
 In its simplest form, the stochastic version of the gravity equation for trade 
can be written as follows: 
ijijjiij DYYT ηα ααα 3210=   (2) 
This equation states that the trade flow from country i to country j (Tij) is 
proportional to the product of the two countries' GDP (Yi and Yj), and inversely 
proportional to their distance (Dij).  GDP refers to economic mass and distance 
proxies for the resistance to trade, namely transportation costs and time costs.  The 
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amount of trade between two countries is therefore assumed to increase with size 
(GDP) and decrease with transportation costs (distance).  The α's are the unknown 
parameters to be estimated and ηij is the disturbance term.  This simple gravity 
equation is often augmented with dummy variables for adjacency, common 
language, and membership in trade agreements.  One model that is therefore often 
considered for estimation is an augmented version of equation (2), which takes the 
following form: 
ijij eeDYYEXP Pijjiij
μβββββ 65210=  (3) 
where 
EXPij refers to exports from country i to country j, 
Yi and Yj refer to gross domestic product of country i and country j, 
Dij refers to distance between country i and country j, 
Pij refers to dummy variables for common language and countries that share a 
common border, 
μij refers to the disturbance term. 
From equation (3) above, the supply of exports from country i is based on 
this country's own GDP, and the demand for country i's exports (country j's 
imports) is based on country j's GDP.  Once again, distance measures the resistance 
to trade as described above.  Equations (2) and (3) are basically similar to equation 
(1) and in order to take into account other factors that may affect trade patterns, a 
number of conditioning variables are added to the basic gravity equation.  
Specifically, dummy variables (Pij) are included to reflect specific deviations from 
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expected trade patterns as a result of common language and common border.  In 
addition, the land area of the countries is also included since it is expected that 
countries with larger land masses will trade less.  Both equations (2) and (3) follow 
the same   Given the multiplicative nature of the model, we can use its log-linear 
version for estimation purposes6.  Because of the nature of the data used in the 
current paper, the specific econometric representation of our gravity equation 
takes the form of a triple-indexed model as suggested by Matyas (1997), but with a 
slight modification for the fixed effects based on Cheng and Wall (2005): 
ijtjtitji
ijjtitijtijt
LABSLABSAREAAREA
BORDERLANGDYYEX
μββββ
βββββααα
++++
++++++++=
9876
543210
lnln
lnlnlnln
(4) 
where  
EXijt represents exports from country i to country j at time t;  Yit and Yjt refer to 
GDP of countries i and j at time t; Dij is the great circle distance between country i 
and country j; LANG is a binary variable which is unity if countries i and j have a 
common language; BORDER is a binary variable which is unity if countries i and j 
share a common border; AREAit and AREAjt refers to the land masses of countries i 
and j; LABSit and LABSjt refer to the different measures for labor standards in 
countries i and j at time t; μijt is the normal disturbance term and is assumed to be 
well-behaved; i = 1, 2, …, N; j = 1, 2, …N; N = 13, i ≠ j; t = 1988, 1989,…, 2001; T 
= 14.   
                                                 
6 The specification of the gravity model in log-linear terms allows one to interpret the different 
coefficients as elasticities, even though the model itself is initially expressed in multiplicative form. 
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The intercept in the above equation has three parts: α0 is common to all 
years and country pairs, αt is specific to year t and common to all pairs, while αij is 
specific to country pairs and common to all years.  Since we have a high 
correlation between GDP and population in our data (at 0.95 for i and j), we do 
not include variables for population for countries i and j, as is often the case in 
empirical specifications, to avoid the multicollinearity problem.  However, we also 
consider the inclusion of income per capita in the gravity equation instead of 
population, to verify the idea that higher income countries trade more in general.   
It is expected that β1 and β2 are positive since countries that are large 
economically tend to trade more.  The coefficients β4 and β5 are expected to be 
positive as countries with a common language or border with another country are 
expected to trade more among themselves. β3, which is the coefficient on the 
distance variable and captures resistance to trade, is expected to have a negative 
value. β6 and β7 are assumed to be negative because countries that are large 
geographically are expected to trade less.  As for the labor standard variables, β8 
and β9 are assumed to have opposing effects, based on the fact that labor standards 
represent an additional cost that is likely to influence trade flows.  More precisely, 
an improvement in country i's labor standard represents an increase in labor costs 
and is likely to have a negative influence on export performance according to the 
conventional wisdom; by the same logic, an improvement in country j's labor 
standard will lead to more trade from country i to country j.  However, if labor 
standards also improve productivity, and lead to an increase in export performance 
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as discussed above, then the signs of β8 and β9 may be different from what we have 
just described.  Indeed to the extent that, for example, providing a safer working 
environment may induce workers to perform better, the overall effect on export 
performance may be different from the conventional wisdom.   
     Prior to the papers by Matyas (1997, 1998), a major weakness of 
empirical studies using the gravity model was the type of data and the associated 
model restrictions that accompanied the latter.  In most cases, gravity models used 
cross-section data to estimate trade patterns at a given point in time, or single time-
series data were considered in a country-by-country approach.  However, 
heterogeneity across countries (or country pairs) is quite likely and should be 
accounted for, failing which our econometric models might be mis-specified and 
our estimates biased.  In the present case, we use a panel dataset, which not only 
increases the degrees of freedom, but also allows us to consider the time-varying 
effects as well as mitigating the risks of choosing an unrepresentative year.  
Furthermore, the use of panel data allows one to consider unobservable individual 
effects between trading partners and to control for heterogeneous trading 
relationships.  The choice between a fixed-effects model (FEM) and random-effects 
model (REM) needs to be considered.  As argued by Egger (2000), if one is 
interested in estimating equations based on a predetermined sample of countries, 
the FEM should be chosen over a REM.  The latter would be more appropriate if 
one considers a randomly drawn sample of trading partners from a larger 
population.  Given that we consider only countries that are EU members, the 
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FEM is the most appropriate specification; in fact, the Hausman test confirmed 
that the FEM is more appropriate in our case.    
 A problem with the FEM is that it does not allow us to estimate coefficients 
on time invariant variables (such as distance, common language dummies, and 
areas).  One way to deal with this issue is to perform panel regressions excluding 
fixed effects, and replacing the latter with the time invariant variables.  Even 
though this approach takes into account some sources of cross-sectional variation, 
it may produce biased coefficients if omitted individual effects are correlated with 
the regressors.  Cheng and Wall (2005) argue that one can find a reasonable 
compromise by simply following a two-step procedure.  First, a standard FEM 
regression is estimated without the time invariant variables.  Second, a cross-section 
regression with the country-pair fixed effects obtained from the first step as the 
dependent variable, and a set of independent variables that includes the time-
invariant variables omitted in the first step together with other traditional 
explanatory variables, is estimated.  To summarize, the two-step procedure is 
represented by equations (4)* and (4)** as follows: 
ijtjtitjtitijtijt LABSLABSYYEX μββββααα +++++++= 98210 lnlnln      (4)* 
ijtjtitj
iijjtitij
eLABSbLABSbAREAb
AREAbBORDERbLANGbDbYbYbb
+++
+++++++=∧
987
6543210
ln
lnlnlnlnα
 
(4)** 
The coefficients for the labor standard variables from equations (4)* and 
(4)** above measure different things.  More precisely, β8 and β9 measure the time 
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dimension of labor standards, that is, variations in export performance as a result 
of the imposition of labor standards and their evolution over time, which is our 
main focus.  b8 and b9 measure the cross section dimension of standards, that is, 
variations in export performance because of differences or similarities among 
country-pairs.  The two-step procedure, therefore, allows us to identify unobserved 
fixed effects that affect bilateral trade, as well as their determinants.   Since our 
primary interest is in finding the effects of labor standards on export performance, 
we will focus on the first step mainly, without discounting the fact that the 
consistent estimation of time-invariant effects is also important.  However, we will 
also discuss the results from the second step, especially with regards to the standard 
gravity variables.     
The papers by Matyas (1997, 1998) identify exporting and importing 
country effects separately and this distinguishes countries that have strong 
propensities to export and import after controlling for differences in other factors 
such as population and GDP.  In other words, the underlying structure for their 
fixed-effects is slightly different from ours.  Given once again that our main focus is 
on the effects of labor standards, and not on the country fixed-effects per se, we 
model the latter differently by assuming that the country effects are pair-wise and 
differ according to the direction of trade (that is, αij ≠ αji).  This assumption is more 
realistic because the relation between country-pairs will likely depend on the role 
of countries within each pair.  Furthermore, our sample of countries is fairly 
homogeneous, compared to a situation where one would have considered a larger 
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sample of countries (for example, developed and developing countries together).  
As a result, one can reasonably expect the pair-wise effects to be more important in 
our case than individual exporting- or importing-effects.       
 Accordingly, the first set estimates that we will present in this paper will be 
based on the pooled-cross-section model estimated by OLS, which tends to provide 
biased estimates.  In other words, we will assume that pair-specific intercepts are 
the same across country pairs (αij  = 0) and that slope coefficients do not vary 
across country pairs and over time.  We will then compare these results with a 
second set of estimates based on the FEM, and the associated two-step procedure 
outlined above. 
   
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Data Description 
Our empirical analysis exploits an unbalanced panel dataset of annual observations 
for 13 countries over a 14-year period7.  The dependent variable EXijt refers to 
exports of manufactured goods in US$ (ISIC Rev. 3 categories 15-37) and was 
obtained from the OECD (2002) Bilateral Trade Database (BTD) and International 
Trade by Commodity Statistics (ITCS); it is denoted as lmex.  In order to see 
whether factor intensities play a role in our model, we use different versions of our 
dependent variable, namely high technology manufactures exports and low 
technology manufactures exports (lhtmex and lltmex), which can be interpreted as 
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reflecting different factor intensities of the exports.  High technology manufactures 
includes goods such as pharmaceuticals, computing machinery, electrical and 
optical equipment and aircraft and spacecraft; low technology manufactures 
includes food products, textiles, and wood and paper products.  To the extent that 
high (low) technology manufactures are capital (labor) intensive, labor standards 
will have a lower (higher) impact on export performance because of different 
effects on costs.  In other words, we should expect labor standards to be more 
significant in the case of low technology manufactures as the latter tend to be more 
labor intensive.  Data for GDP, GDP per capita and land mass are from the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank.  Distance is measured in kilometres 
by great circle air distances between capital cities as a proxy for transportation 
costs8. 
In order to capture labor standards across countries, we consider a number 
of indicators.  We recognize that some of the measures of labor standards described 
below are not perfect and that these measures can produce a lot of noise.  An 
example of such a labor standard used in other empirical studies (but not used in 
the current paper) is the number of core ILO-conventions ratified, which describes 
the intentions of countries to establish regulations but does not guarantee that such 
intentions are translated into actual labor regulations.  As argued by Van Beers 
(1998), “The concrete results of labor regulations are a better representation of the 
                                                                                                                                           
7 Since we do not have separate data for Belgium and Luxembourg, these two countries had to be 
removed from the EU-15 countries, leaving us with only 13 countries. 
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actual costs of a relatively high labor standard to be borne by a producer than 
measures based on input efforts of governments” (p. 60).  Even if some of the 
indicators that we use such as trade union density or work hours may represent 
individual choices or the strength of interest groups, rather than standards per se, 
we are simply using them as proxies for labor standards in order to assess their 
impact on export performance, and they measure actual regulations.  We 
acknowledge that the indicators are not perfect, but there are few alternative 
measures of labor standards over long periods of time (despite some headway at the 
ILO to construct better indicators of worker rights - see for example, Kucera and 
Sarna, 2006) that can be used in a panel framework such as the one being employed 
in this paper. 
We use total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP (lsoc) from 
the OECD Social Expenditure Database as one indicator for labor standards, and 
this variable includes unemployment benefits and incapacity related benefits, 
which can be proxied as indicators of labor standards in a given country.  We 
consider an overall index of labor market well-being from the Centre for the Study 
of Living Standards as another indicator, and this variable is denoted as lwell.  We 
have data for the latter that covers the period 1989-2001 for nine countries in our 
sample.  The index takes into account average returns from work, the aggregate 
accumulation of human capital, inequality in current returns from work, and 
insecurity in the anticipation of future returns from work.   
                                                                                                                                           
8 Variables for distance, language and contiguity were obtained from the "Centre d'Etudes 
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We consider the number of actual weekly hours worked in the 
manufacturing sector (lhou) by wage earners and salaried employees, and this 
variable is obtained from the ILO database LABORSTA.  Most EU member 
countries set their working time arrangements by law or through collective 
bargaining agreements and they differ in their approach to the regulation of 
working time.  In fact, most countries in our sample have a statutory maximum 
working week of 48 hours (as set in the EU working time directive) or 40 hours. 
Our data considers the actual hours worked as opposed to what the regulations 
establish.   
Trade union density rates, lun, are also considered and they are obtained 
from the OECD Labor Market Statistics Database, which are based on surveys or 
administrative data.    We also have data on strikes and lockouts, lstr, for most of 
the countries over the period considered, which reflects the ability of workers to 
express their concerns.  Finally, we consider occupational injuries, linj, in the 
manufacturing sector per thousand people employed or insured, which is an 
indicator of safety at the workplace.  Because of the way that the different labor 
standards explained above are measured, an increase (decrease) in lsoc, lwell, lstri, 
lun, and a decrease (increase) in lhou and linj, represent improvements 
(deterioration) in standards over time, with the usual cost and competitiveness 
implications.  Table 1 below provides summary statistics for the variables that are 
used in the empirical analysis.   
                                                                                                                                           
Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales" (CEPII) website at http://www.cepii.fr/ 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Name Number of 
Observations 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
lmex 2100 14.35 14.42 1.68 
lhtmex 2100 12.28 12.62 2.23 
lltmex 2100 13.18 13.24 1.50 
lgdpi 2184 26.40 26.06 1.12 
lgdppci 2184 9.76 9.88 0.35 
lgdpj 2184 26.38 26.02 1.11 
lgdppcj 2184 9.76 9.87 0.35 
ldistance 2184 7.15 7.27 0.58 
larea 2184 12.07 12.41 0.90 
lwell 1344 -0.56 -0.54 0.09 
lsoc 2160 3.17 3.19 0.21 
lhou 1872 3.63 3.65 0.11 
lun 2184 3.55 3.56 0.61 
linj 1380 1.31 1.36 0.69 
lstr 1848 4.48 4.81 1.94 
Note: All variables are in natural logs. 
 
As one can see, we have fewer observations for the variables representing 
labor standards than for the other 'economic' variables, but that still leaves us with 
a large number of observations in each case.  The mean and median values are not 
too different for most variables suggesting that extreme values are not frequent, 
and the standard deviations are quite small in most cases.   
 
4.2 Results of Empirical Analysis 
In table 2 below, we show the results when occupational injuries (linji and linjj for 
countries i and j respectively) are considered as labor standards as it is one indicator 
that is least likely to be subject to some of the problems mentioned above9.  In 
                                                 
9 Results with the other indicators are provided in the appendix, and additional results (discussed 
but not included in the paper) are available upon request.   
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particular, they are not individual choices or manifestations of interest group 
preferences.  Column (1) shows the results for the baseline model (without the 
labor standard) using pooled OLS with lmex as the dependent variable, for the 
period 1988 to 2001.   
In addition to the variables listed in table 1, we include additional controls 
in the form of dummies for membership in the European Free Trade Association, 
efta, membership in the European Community, ec, and for countries that have 
adopted the euro, euro.  These dummies are included to capture the effects of 
economic integration and many papers find that the introduction of the euro has 
increased trade.  The euro became legal tender in 2002 but it went into use for 
accounting purposes and electronic fund transfers in 11 EU member states in 1999, 
and in Greece in 2001.  We therefore constructed the variable euro based on this 
information given that our sample size covers the period 1988 to 2001.  Robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses.  The results reported in column (1) for the 
baseline model contain more observations than in the remaining ones because of 
limited availability of the occupational injuries variable; these results do not change 
significantly when the baseline model is run by considering the sample that 
contains data on occupational injuries (linji and linjj) only.  The standard variables 
used in gravity equations (gdp, area, distance, language and border) are mostly 
significant with the right signs, and the R-squared is in line with other studies using 
the gravity model.  Columns (2) to (4) show what happens when occupational 
injuries are added to the model, when fixed effects estimation is considered in 
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addition to pooled OLS, and when lhtmex is also considered as a dependent 
variable.   
Table 2: Effects of Occupational Injuries on Trade Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
LMEX 
(Pooled 
OLS) 
LMEX 
(Pooled 
OLS) 
LMEX 
(FEM) 
LHTMEX 
(FEM) 
LMEX 
FEM 
LMEX 
FEM 
LHTMEX 
FEM 
LMEX 
GMM 
         
Constant -22.30** -17.67** -19.30** -18.89** -23.79** -18.71** -16.98** - 
 (-32.42) (-29.35) (-11.63) (-9.35) (-12.98) (-11.16) (-9.36) - 
lgdpi 0.82** 0.58** 0.54** 0.55** 0.53** 0.44** 0.39** 0.44** 
 (40.29) (56.22) (12.43) (8.57) (12.17) (9.20) (6.12) (3.27) 
lgdpj 0.79** 0.69** 0.76** 0.69** 0.76** 0.82** 0.75** 0.74** 
 (57.71) (35.85) (35.33) (30.11) (38.87) (33.38) (32.83) (47.87) 
lareai -0.03** -0.13** - - - - - - 
 (-2.08) (-7.91) - - - - - - 
lareaj 0.01 -0.13** - - - - - - 
 (0.23) (-10.12) - - - - - - 
ldistance -0.79** -0.61** - - - - - - 
 (-34.15) (-27.53) - - - - - - 
language 0.66** 0.15** - - - - - - 
 (16.41) (2.94) - - - - - - 
border 0.49** 1.01** - - - - - - 
 (50.76) (25.01) - - - - - - 
ec 0.05** 0.04 0.11 0.24** 0.10 0.12 0.22 - 
 (2.57) (1.29) (0.84) (2.16) (0.77) (0.88) (1.43) - 
efta -0.08 -0.19** 0.38 0.39* 0.36 0.23 0.23 - 
 (-1.13) (-2.06) (1.28) (1.94) (1.18) (0.99) (1.10) - 
euro -0.01 -0.08** -0.16 -0.13 -0.15 0.13 0.09 - 
 (-0.35) (-3.10) (-1.09) (-1.04) (-1.06) (1.06) (0.59) - 
linji - -0.23** -0.38** -0.85** -0.32** - - -0.04 
 - (-9.70) (-8.52) (-17.23) (-5.03) - - (-0.16) 
linjj - -0.11** -0.13** -0.21** -0.11** - - 0.28** 
 - (-7.43) (-4.00) (-7.27) (-2.27) - - (4.47) 
lgdppci - - - - 0.37 - - - 
 - - - - (1.26) - - - 
lgpppcj - - - - 0.08 - - - 
 - - - - (0.55) - - - 
linji(-1) - - - - - -0.33** -0.58** - 
 - - - - - (-5.68) (-6.45) - 
linjj(-1) - - - - - 0.23** 0.25** - 
 - - - - - (7.72) (6.79) - 
         
N 2100 801 801 801 801 746 746 612 
Adj. R-squared 0.87 0.91 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.21 
Hausman Test  
(p-value) 
- - 52.58 
(0.00) 
19.19 
(0.00) 
52.12 
(0.00) 
60.01 
(0.00) 
33.85 
(0.00) 
- 
J-statistic - - - - - - - 41.93 
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Note: Robust t-statistics are shown in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.  
 
In column (2), the standard variables used in gravity equations (gdp, area, 
distance, language and border) are also highly significant and with the right sign.  
For instance, countries that share a common border or language trade more; 
countries that are physically larger tend to trade less, while those that are 
economically larger tend to trade more.  The conventional wisdom that lower 
standards lead to an improvement in export performance is true only for linjj and 
not linji.  In other words, when a country’s own standard improves, its trade 
performance also improves (as productivity effects outweigh cost considerations), 
but when its trading partner’s standard improves, its trade performance improves 
again (implying that it is able to better penetrate its partner’s market as the latter is 
less competitive).  Our explanation for this is that the effects of a country’s own 
standard materialize faster than what happens in the other country, suggesting that 
there is a lag before the effects get transmitted.  Results based on pooled OLS for 
the other labor standards are reported in table 1A in the appendix when LMEX is 
the dependent variable. 
In table 1A, we chose not to consider all the indicators together as this 
reduces the degrees of freedom considerably, and one has to be mindful of 
multicollinearity among the standards since some of the latter tend to overlap.  For 
example the index of overall labor market well-being is highly correlated with the 
measure for social expenditure, and the number of hours worked.    However, 
 24
when different combinations of standards that are not highly collinear are 
introduced, the results did not change substantially10.  Even though most of the 
indicators for labor standards are significant, most of them go against the 
conventional wisdom that lower standards lead to an improvement in export 
performance.  The only exception for country i, is lstrii, and for country j, lwellj.  
For example, an improvement in labor market well-being in country i is 
significantly positively correlated with an improvement in export performance, 
and the same is true for an improvement in labor market well-being in country j.  
Hence, the conventional wisdom that countries with lower standards obtain an 
advantage in trade is not confirmed for country i's standard (suggesting that 
productivity effects may be at work because of better standards), but is confirmed 
for country j's standard. 
  In column (3) of table 1 above, we report fixed-effects estimates with time 
and country dummies, and these refer to equation (3)*, which is the first stage of 
the two-step procedure by Cheng and Wall (2005).  As explained earlier, the time-
invariant variables are omitted from the regression equation.  The choice of the 
FEM is based on the Hausman test, and F-tests could not reject the joint 
hypothesis that the country effects are all zero, thus confirming the presence of 
country effects.  This finding also suggests that the effect of labor standards on 
export competitiveness is not the same for all country pairs in our sample.  Time 
fixed effects are included in the regressions to account for institutional integration 
                                                 
10 This is also carried out in Rodrik (1996) and Dehejia and Samy (2004), for example. 
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in the EU over time.  Once again, the effects of occupational injuries are the same 
as in column (2).  Fixed effects estimates for the other labor standards are reported 
in table 2A in the appendix (with lmex as the dependent variable) and the general 
observation is that there is mixed evidence regarding the fact that high labor 
standards reduce export competitiveness.   
As expected, the results in column (3) of table 2 above show that countries 
that are large economically tend to trade more.  Concerning the effects of labor 
standards on export performance, we once again obtain mixed evidence regarding 
the fact that high labor standards reduce export competitiveness.  Results for the 
second stage of the FEM (equation (3)**) are included in the appendix (see table 
3A), and they generally tend to confirm the theoretical expectations of the pair-
specific time invariant variables.  More precisely, economic size, distance, language 
and the border effect are significant and of the right sign.  There are, however, 
some strange results with respect to the dummies (ec and efta) as well as the area 
variables.  This could be a result of an omitted variable bias as a result of, for 
example, the difficulty of clearly identifying cross country variability.       
  In column (4) of table 2, the results on labor standards do not change 
significantly when lhtmex is considered as the dependent variable even though one 
would a priori have expected high technology manufactures to be less affected by 
labor standards.  This is surprising and may be due to the fact that even though 
lhtmex reflects different factor intensities, it does not allow us to differentiate skill-
intensities.  For example, capital intensive goods may be produced with relatively 
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low-skilled labor whose demand is more elastic, so that when standards improve, 
the cost implications are as severe as in the case of lmex.  Results for the other labor 
standards and with lhtmex as the dependent variable are shown in table 4A in the 
appendix and suggest the possibility of skill effects being at work given the 
relatively high significance of the labor standard variables. 
In order to check the robustness of the results in table 2 above we perform 
sensitivity analysis along three dimensions and report the results in columns (5)-(8).  
First, we examine what happens when GDP per capita for countries i and j are 
included to the specification in column (3).  As can be seen in column (5), the 
results do not change significantly (the results for the other labor standards – not 
shown here – did not change either) when GDP per capita is included.   In the case 
of lmex, with fixed effects and the inclusion of GDP per capita for countries i and j, 
for instance, the conventional wisdom was confirmed in all cases, except for lstrii, 
and lstrij.  When lhtmex was considered as the dependent variable together with 
GDP per capita, the conventional wisdom was not obtained in the case of lsocj, 
lunij, linji, lhouj, and lstrij, roughly half of the indicators for labor standards 
considered in this paper.  This again suggests that productivity effects tend to 
outweigh the costs of standards in several cases.  Second, reverse causality might 
also be a problem affecting our results since countries with better export 
performance can also afford higher labor standards.  One way of dealing with this 
is to use lagged values for labor standards.   
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Columns (6) and (7) report the results with lagged values of occupational 
injuries and with lmex and lhtmex as dependent variables respectively.  
Surprisingly, the conventional wisdom disappears completely, suggesting that 
better labor standards improve productivity and are associated with improved 
export performance.  The same result was obtained when other indicators for labor 
standards in the appendix were lagged (results not shown here).  Third, to further 
deal with the endogeneity problem and given that we have panel data at our 
disposal, dynamic panel data using a GMM estimator (Arrellano and Bond, 1991) is 
a possibility worth exploring.  In column (8), we re-estimated the model in column 
(3) using GMM methods but omitted the dummy variables from the specification 
because of the fixed effects (this is not a problem given the low significance of the 
dummies in previous specifications).  Even though occupational injuries for 
country i (linji) are not significant, the conventional wisdom once again disappears 
in the case of linjj.  Columns (6), (7) and (8) also confirm the presence of lags in the 
transmission of the effects of labor standards on export performance as we 
conjectured earlier. 
     
5. Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the conventional wisdom that countries will experience 
an improvement in export competitiveness as a result of lower labor standards in a 
panel framework for EU-15 countries over the period 1988-2001, by testing the 
gravity model of trade.  While the issue of trade and labor standards has been 
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examined extensively in a North-South framework, it has been generally 
overlooked in the case of regional trade agreements, especially when countries that 
share similar political systems are free to set their own labor standards.  Given the 
recent wave of regionalism around the world, we believe it is important to examine 
the social policy (of which labor standards are an important element) implications 
of integration through increased trade.  In fact, the data used in this paper show 
that members of the EU-15 continue to maintain distinct labor practices despite 
calls and attempts at harmonization.  Furthermore, despite its solid empirical 
record when put to test, the gravity model has hardly been applied in the context 
of trade and labor standards, possibly because of a lack of data.  We focused our 
attention on occupational injuries as an indicator of safety at the workplace to 
examine the implications of labor standards for export performance.  This choice 
was based on the fact that occupational injuries are less likely to be affected by 
problems such as workers in different countries choosing a particular level of a 
standard (e.g. unionization or working hours) compared to 'pure' differences in 
standards commonly discussed in the literature.   We also considered a number of 
different, albeit weaker, proxies for labor standards and discussed their 
implications.   
Our estimates, based on pooled OLS and the FEM, and after conducting 
robustness checks, indicate that labor standards matter, but that the conventional 
wisdom is not always true.  In fact, we find numerous cases where improvements 
in labor standards are related to improvements in export performance, suggesting 
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that productivity improvements as a result of better standards outweigh the costs 
of the standards themselves.  There is thus a need to look into these findings 
further, possibly through surveys or case studies at the firm level that examine the 
standards in place, and the response of economic agents to the latter to determine 
why they have differing impacts on trade flows.  These are in our view interesting 
areas for future research which our existing framework cannot explain.  
Nevertheless, our empirical results have important implications for policy makers 
who are working in the area of standards harmonization, who are thinking about 
linking trade agreements with labor standards, and in our case, the recent 
enlargement of the EU as well as the possibility of future enlargement.  Given that 
high labor standards do not seem to be systematically related to a deterioration in 
export performance, there does not appear to be a strong basis for the fear that 
countries will be forced in a race to the bottom of standards as integration proceeds 
further, contrary to popular discourse.  This is, in our view, an important 
contribution to the existing literature, given that the latter is largely based on cross-
sectional data and a factor-proportions framework, and that there has been no real 
attempt as of date, to test alternative models of trade such as the gravity model.  
An interesting question for further research, pending the availability of data, 
remains the recent accession of the ten new members to the EU and how they will 
influence the trade-labor nexus.  
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Appendix A 
Table 1A: Pooled Cross-Section (Dependent Variable: LMEX) 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -22.30** -14.22** -22.28 -24.43** -20.21** -21.01** 
 (-32.42) (-16.31) (-53.33) (-35.19) (-46.21) (-98.94) 
lgdpi 0.82** 0.60** 0.81** 0.87** 0.90** 0.82** 
 (40.29) (84.20) (42.45) (53.07) (66.10) (80.45) 
lgdpj 0.79** 0.68** 0.79** 0.79** 0.82** 0.78** 
 (57.71) (40.77) (64.03) (48.89) (68.34) (94.84) 
lareai -0.03** 0.08** -0.03** -0.03** -0.13** -0.03* 
 (-2.08) (4.92) (-2.75) (-1.98) (-8.03) (-2.01) 
lareaj 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.23) (0.85) (-0.09) (0.10) (-0.43) (-1.43) 
ldistance -0.79** -0.70** -0.79** -0.79** -0.72** -0.81** 
 (-34.15) (-11.07) (-52.44) (-24.95) (-38.52) (-30.55) 
language 0.66** 0.03 0.64** 0.58** 0.81** 0.10** 
 (16.41) (0.33) (18.41) (18.11) (16.82) (2.12) 
border 0.49** 0.45** 0.49** 0.50** 0.44** 0.88** 
 (50.76) (22.88) (40.16) (37.40) (17.35) (30.07) 
ec 0.05** 0.05 0.04* 0.05** 0.03** 0.07** 
 (2.57) (1.09) (1.76) (2.17) (2.87) (4.65) 
efta -0.08 -0.27** -0.10 -0.20** -0.33** -0.02 
 (-1.13) (-3.56) (-1.66) (-3.06) (-3.40) (-0.22) 
euro -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
 (-0.35) (0.97) (-0.61) (-0.73) (-0.43) (-0.62) 
lwelli  0.98** - - - - 
  (5.53) - - - - 
lwellj  0.54** - - - - 
  (3.57) - - - - 
lsoci  - 0.17** - - - 
  - (4.11) - - - 
lsocj  - -0.11** - - - 
  - (-2.57) - - - 
lunii  - - 0.05** - - 
  - - (2.17) - - 
lunij  - - -0.20** - - 
  - - (-3.06) - - 
lhoui  - - - -1.28** - 
  - - - (-18.21) - 
lhouj  - - - 0.15** - 
  - - - (1.96) - 
lstrii  - - - - -0.09** 
  - - - - (-22.43) 
lstrij  - - - - -0.03** 
  - - - - (-6.49) 
       
N 2100 784 2076 2100 1521 1506 
Adj. R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.87 
       
Note: Robust t-statistics are shown in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.  
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Table 2A: Fixed Effects Estimates (Dependent Variable: LMEX) 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -31.82** -9.42** -33.57** -37.84** -26.43** -23.88** 
 (-35.78) (-3.66) (-36.15) (-53.96) (-28.23) (-16.80) 
lgdpi 0.82** 0.20** 0.80** 0.94** 0.94** 0.61** 
 (24.33) (2.08) (23.37) (34.49) (21.07) (11.83) 
lgdpj 0.93** 0.79** 0.92 0.95** 0.95** 0.86** 
 (225.84) (64.72) (184.88) (129.50) (73.43) (123.66) 
ec 0.11* 0.10 0.11* 0.12** 0.07 0.15** 
 (1.88) (1.00) (1.71) (1.97) (1.19) (2.30) 
efta 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.12 
 (0.03) (0.06) (-0.08) (0.05) (0.14) (0.43) 
euro -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 
 (-0.45) (-0.13) (-0.39) (-0.83) (0.42) (-0.13) 
lwelli - 0.24 - - - - 
 - (0.46) - - - - 
lwellj - 3.23** - - - - 
 - (14.56) - - - - 
lsoci - - 0.57** - - - 
 - - (2.81) - - - 
lsocj - - 0.23** - - - 
 - - (3.95) - - - 
lunii - - - 0.47** - - 
 - - - (9.68) - - 
lunij - - - 0.11** - - 
 - - - (2.95) - - 
lhoui - - - - -2.33** - 
 - - - - (-9.92) - 
lhouj - - - - -0.24 - 
 - - - - (-1.13) - 
lstrii - - - - - -0.14** 
 - - - - - (-10.11) 
lstrij - - - - - -0.06** 
 - - - - - (-4.13) 
       
N 2100 784 2076 2100 1521 1506 
Adj. R-squared 0.78 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.73 
Hausman Test  
(p-value) 
34.93 
(0.00) 
203.09 
(0.00) 
32.14 
(0.00) 
45.43 
(0.00) 
21.97 
(0.00) 
146.45 
(0.00) 
       
Note: Robust t-statistics are shown in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.  
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Table 3A: Cross Section Results (Step 2 following Cheng and Wall (2005)) 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant 0.62 -6.64** 1.15* 1.07* 0.14 1.97* 6.19** 
 (1.22) (-4.31) (1.70) (1.86) (-0.15) (1.83) (6.74) 
lgdpi -0.02 0.20** -0.02 0.03** 0.02 -0.01 0.17** 
 (-1.69) (4.30) (-0.92) (2.54) (1.00) (-0.65) (6.37) 
lgdpj 0.01 0.33** -0.01 0.01 0.07** 0.05** 0.12** 
 (0.10) (8.84) (-0.19) (0.57) (3.01) (2.58) (5.11) 
lareai 0.04** -0.25** 0.03** 0.04 -0.04** 0.02 0.19** 
 (2.94) (-6.91) (2.05) (3.08) (-1.71) (0.87) (7.16) 
lareaj 0.01 -0.26** -0.01 -0.01 -0.12** 0.30 0.10 
 (0.84) (-6.63) (-0.29) (-0.11) (-5.03) (1.30) (3.55) 
ldistance -0.09** 0.09 -0.10** -0.10** -0.08 -0.12** -0.29** 
 (-4.16) (1.70) (-4.70) (-4.22) (-1.94) (-3.29) (-6.98) 
language 0.23** 0.70** 0.21** 0.30** -0.15 0.21** 0.63** 
 (5.87) (4.50) (4.78) (7.18) (-1.69) (3.26) (9.68) 
border -0.06* 0.42** -0.05 0.13** 0.06 0.03 0.63** 
 (-1.90) (8.89) (-1.53) (4.60) (1.28) (0.53) (9.68) 
ec -0.03 -0.25** -0.08** -0.06** 0.11** -0.03 0.07 
 (-1.13) (-3.33) (-3.10) (-2.27) (2.62) (-0.76) (1.45) 
efta -0.22** 0.05 -0.34** -0.45** -0.42** -0.46** -0.24** 
 (-4.28) (0.53) (-5.48) (-9.69) (-5.80) (-5.68) (-3.33) 
eur 0.05* -0.26** 0.04* 0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.06 
 (1.81) (-3.11) (1.73) (1.41) (-0.60) (1.17) (-0.70) 
lwelli - 1.21** - - - - - 
 - (5.23) - - - - - 
lwellj - 1.71** - - - - - 
 - (8.79) - - - - - 
lsoci - - -0.05** - - - - 
 - - (-1.19) - - - - 
lsocj - - 0.08** - - - - 
 - - (1.98) - - - - 
lunii - - - -0.07** - - - 
 - - - (-4.33) - - - 
lunij - - - -0.01 - - - 
 - - - (-0.74) - - - 
linji - - - - 0.09** - - 
 - - - - (4.71) - - 
linjj - - - - 0.09** - - 
 - - - - (3.82) - - 
lhoui - - - - - 0.12 - 
 - - - - - (0.75) - 
lhouj - - - - - -0.11 - 
 - - - - - (-0.75) - 
lstrii - - - - - - -0.02 
 - - - - - - (-1.61) 
lstrij - - - - - - -0.01 
 - - - - - - (-0.12) 
        
N 2184 672 2136 2184 722 1558 1525 
Adj. R-squared 0.03 0.33 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.04 
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Note: Robust t-statistics are shown in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.  
 
 
Table 4A: Fixed Effects Estimates (Dependent Variable: LHTMEX) 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -39.29** -10.90** -42.03** -48.76** -30.92** -38.41** 
 (-64.39) (-3.56) (-47.38) (-97.64) (-23.56) (-19.08) 
lgdpi 0.99** 0.26** 0.95** 1.19** 1.21** 1.07** 
 (41.14) (2.32) (37.48) (68.51) (30.49) (14.72) 
lgdpj 0.95** 0.72** 0.94** 1.01** 0.96** 0.97** 
 (111.96) (51.22) (93.65) (116.46) (57.63) (51.18) 
ec 0.20** 0.10 0.19** 0.22** 0.23** 0.25** 
 (2.62) (1.02) (2.18) (2.68) (2.22) (3.81) 
efta 0.03 0.13 -0.07 0.03 0.29 0.18 
 (0.13) (0.57) (-0.28) (0.16) (0.93) (0.67) 
euro -0.01 -0.15 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 
 (-0.11) (-1.38) (-0.17) (-0.57) (-0.19) (-0.38) 
lwelli - 0.59 - - - - 
 - (0.89) - - - - 
lwellj - 2.77** - - - - 
 - (18.81) - - - - 
lsoci - - 1.03** - - - 
 - - (5.56) - - - 
lsocj - - 0.31* - - - 
 - - (2.16) - - - 
lunii - - - 0.75** - - 
 - - - (17.06) - - 
lunij - - - 0.18** - - 
 - - - (6.53) - - 
lhoui - - - - -3.78** - 
 - - - - (-14.83) - 
lhouj - - - - -0.22 - 
 - - - - (-0.70) - 
lstrii - - - - - -0.57** 
 - - - - - (-32.55) 
lstrij - - - - - -0.13** 
 - - - - - (-7.32) 
       
N 2100 784 2076 2100 1521 1506 
Adj. R-squared 0.67 0.77 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.77 
       
Note: Robust t-statistics are shown in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. 
 
 
 
